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What Christians need no 
longer defend: The politi-
cal stakes of considering 
antinomianism as central 
to the practice and history 
of theology
Colby Dickinson
Abstract:
Through a brief history of antinomian thought within the modern 
period, and the inspection of two contemporary responses to the 
‘antinomian impulse’, I refocus the antinomian debate as being, 
not necessarily a heretical endeavor, but rather a dialectic between 
history and memory, structure and experience.  Rather than portray 
antinomianism as a threat to the system which needs to be removed, 
perhaps we can learn to perceive it as a ‘weak messianic force’ moving 
through all constituted (religious) identities, not, then, as the end of 
‘Christianity’ as an organized religion, but its original proclamation, ever 
in need of greater reformation.  
Keywords:
antinomianism, heresy, Michel Foucault, Martin Heidegger, 
Giorgio Agamben, Reinhard Hütter
 Introduction
There are a number of ways in which heresy has been labeled over 
the years.  One of the more popular versions is that of ‘antinomianism,’ 
which has reappeared throughout the centuries since the Reformation 
with an increased and intriguing frequency.  It has crept up again and 
again as a major, defining political force of reform and has sparked 
some of the fiercest theological debates the western world has ever 
known.  My thesis in this essay is that we often misunderstand what the 
‘antinomian impulse’ is really about, how it actually plays an essential 
role in giving shape to the Christian faith.  I will contend that unless 
we can learn to appreciate this ‘antinomian impulse’ for what it is—an 
inherent and constituent part of identity itself—we will repeatedly run 
the risk of de-emphasizing one of the most significant internal dynamics 
of a political theological discourse.
 I will explore, first, an all-too-brief history of antinomian thought 
within the modern period, from the Reformation to the present day, in 
the hope that such a rereading will offer a foundation from which to view 
what is really at stake in the oft-recurring antinomian impulses I will later 
pick up and analyze.  Second, I will utilize the insights of both Michel 
Foucault and Martin Heidegger to help us ascertain why both theology 
and philosophy are central disciplines needed to comprehend the stakes 
of any recurring antinomian controversy.  In particular, I want to refocus 
the antinomian debate as being not so much a heretical endeavor, but 
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rather a practical exercise that takes place as a dialectic between history 
and memory, or structure and experience.  Finally, I will point to sites 
within both western theology and philosophy in order to try to isolate 
and identify contemporary antinomian impulses within two more recent 
positions taken with respect to it, in their more or less ‘conservative’ 
and ‘liberal’ guises, while trying to understand the significance of 
antinomianism for the practice of political theology today.
 In all of this, the conclusion I am gesturing toward, though 
perhaps not here arriving at completely, emphasizes a new way 
of relating to antinomianism, and to heresy itself—a perspective 
willing to embrace its (doctrinally) radical ‘other’ in order to gain a 
better understanding of itself.  What I am sketching is certainly a 
hermeneutical, dialectical position through and through.  What I am 
claiming as well is that this repositioning of antinomian thought as what 
lies at the heart of theological history is in fact a political issue above all 
else, one that helps us to see why the consequences of this debate are 
not only heavily political, legal and ethical, but also philosophical in that 
they reveal latent core dynamics underneath the constitution of identity 
itself.  It has not been a surprise to me, then, that so many philosophers 
have recently been attracted to the terrain of political theology, since it 
is precisely on these intersecting grounds that these issues have come 
most clearly to light.  My belief is that such an inclusive position as I try 
to advance here will be a significant aid to theological and philosophical 
practice.
A brief history of modern ‘antinomian’ theologies
A curiously recurrent feature of antinomianism within the history 
of modern Christianity became noticeably prominent when one of Martin 
Luther’s fellow theologians, Johann Agricola, appeared to mistake 
Luther’s opposed stance to the Catholic Church’s hierarchy and rules, 
as well as his firm dependence upon scripture alone, to mean that all 
true Christians should turn away from the rule of law entirely.  In this 
first modern ‘Antinomian controversy’—to be followed century upon 
century by other such controversies within the Church—Agricola and 
Luther went head-to-head in a series of disputations all designed to 
demonstrate, from Luther’s standpoint, the actual necessity of the law 
for social order, and its therefore immutable and inevitable presence in 
our world.  These were points he was certainly not willing to concede, 
not if his movement of reform was to have any real political force.1  Law, 
it would seem, is not something entirely replaceable by grace; it is 
something merely dis-placed, subject to certain temporal qualifications, 
such as the political ‘office’ one must also at times fill.  For Luther, 
there is grace for the believer, but there must also be the sword for the 
‘unbelieving’ masses.
As Reinhard Hütter has recently pointed out, Luther’s response to 
Agricola and the other antinomians was intended to promote a genuine, 
Christian sense of freedom, one wherein the law and the Gospel might 
work together in order to defeat sin.2  Since we are fallen creatures, the 
narrative goes, we must rely upon both the law and the Gospel in order to 
receive God’s unfolding plan of salvation for us.  The law, or the ‘sword,’ 
in Luther’s parlance, may not be absolutely necessary for Christians, 
but it is necessary for the ‘unbelievers’ and the average Christian’s 
relationship to them.  Christians, Luther advised, should consequently 
feel no qualms about being involved in the governing of the state, even if 
that means fulfilling the duties of the ‘hangman.’3  Though Hütter, whose 
analysis of Luther on this point I will address in more detail in the final 
section, does not note the significance of this link between the necessity 
for the law and the Christian’s role in society—one that is complicit at 
certain points with justified violent actions and exclusions—we would 
do well, at least, to draw attention to how the connection between 
Luther’s propensity to maintain order through violent means and his 
stress on the law is not simply a passing coincidence.
 To some, Luther’s approach to the necessity of law was in 
fact a capitulation to his impatient desire for reform and his tendency 
toward the violent means needed, in his eyes, to attain it—an account 
altogether missing from Hütter’s more purely ‘theological’ descriptions 
of Luther’s notion of freedom taken up by Hütter in conjunction with 
natural law.  The critique I am suggesting is essentially the assessment 
offered by the Catholic theologian Yves Congar in his survey of the true 
and false reforms both present within the Church, a project which finds 
him, for more than one reason, evaluating Erasmus more favorably than 
Luther.  In Congar’s eyes,
1  Luther 2008.
2  Hütter 2001, 142.
3  Luther 1962, 374.
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What is striking about the reformers who went into schism is their 
radicalism.  Luther himself was violent and irritable.  He knew this about 
himself, but he thought that it was helping his mission and that without 
it he would not have achieved the work he had to do.  That is not only 
because he would not have dared to do it, but because too moderate an 
approach, like that of Erasmus, would fail to achieve anything effective.4
In other words, to have any traction as politically ‘effective’, 
Luther’s position had to be one that worked with the law (or state, in this 
instance) and which could not be characterized as antinomian, even 
though he might have appeared to some, in his heavy critiques of Roman 
hierarchies, canon law and religious regulations, to be promoting such 
an agenda.
Despite the fact that Agricola eventually rescinded his own 
antinomian position, the original impetus that drove Luther to vigorously 
condemn the antinomian viewpoint as a misreading of Christ’s mission 
entirely, and which was part of his own quest to distinguish between 
the true and the false Church,5 began to accumulate a historical 
currency that did not fade over time, but actually became a routinely 
utilized concept invoked in order to vilify or slander those Christians 
who strayed too far from an ‘orthodox’ acceptance of some level of law 
as functional within both society and the church.  There are, no doubt, 
reasons of contested authority behind such demonstrable tensions 
(Luther vs. the Catholic hierarchy of his day, as only one such example), 
but these tensions, we should note, are often portrayed as theologically 
secondary to the larger doctrinal claims made by both sides—a perhaps 
misplaced priority that I am here contesting.  
 What I would like to draw our attention to, at this point, is the 
implicit manner in which the various charges of antinomianism that 
spring from the Reformation’s political challenge to Catholic authority 
became henceforth insolubly connected to those very same political 
struggles that typify contesting political theologies within the Church.  
What was really being offered as a response to the challenges of 
the Reformation to the Catholic hierarchy, I am suggesting, was the 
Reformation’s own internal challenge to itself, embodied in Agricola’s 
challenge to Luther—a further, ongoing critique of all ecclesial 
4  Congar 2011, 324.
5  See Edwards 1975, 156-179.
structures and authorities—the quest to locate and live out a grace 
apart from all law.  By identifying this perpetual Reformation for what it 
truly is, we might begin to understand anew why antinomianism became, 
and still becomes in many ways, a type of religious, and yet also always, 
political movement which “had haunted the respectable magisterial 
Reformation from its earliest days.”6
Manifesting itself throughout the centuries following the 
Reformation in a variety of guises, from the call to perfection, to an 
effort to embrace an experience of Christ beyond all religious structures, 
for example, charges of antinomian tendencies or its explicitly embodied 
position were anything but few and far between.  In many ways, this 
fundamental accusation of theological heresy often carried with it the 
subtle underpinnings of a genuinely antinomian sentiment—something 
we would do well to investigate much further than I am able to sketch 
here within the long history of modern theology.
 As the Church historian and chronicler of Christian doctrine 
Jaroslav Pelikan has pointed out, even John Wesley, the eventual 
founder of Methodism, accused Nicolaus Zinzendorf, the once Moravian 
bishop, of being antinomian due to his call toward ‘perfectionism’ 
combined with his ecumenical zeal in advocating the love of Christ 
beyond any steadfast institutional affiliations—the real, structural, 
authoritative critique that may have won him the title of antinomian.  
What is revealing in Wesley’s accusation—and this is the point that 
Pelikan rightly draws our attention to—is that Wesley himself critiqued 
such ‘antinomian’ stances while maintaining a fervent tendency himself 
toward moral perfectionism, an embodied tension that, in reality, 
mirrored the Bible’s paradoxical treatment of the subject, for, as Pelikan 
observed, “no one born of God commits sin (1 John 3.9),” and yet there 
is “another law” within us “making us captive to the law of sin (Romans 
7.23).”7
 Providing us with mounting evidence that the charge of 
antinomianism was often a political charge made within the sphere of 
a scriptural or doctrinal point of undecidability, Wesley’s struggle to 
articulate the nature of sin in relation to ecclesial structures was more 
than paralleled by the ‘Antinomian Controversy’ of the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony some years earlier.  Within this early American colony, the 
6  MacCulloch 2009, 653.
7  Pelikan, 1989, 148.  For a more detailed account of Wesley’s views on antinomian thought, 
see Gunter 1989.
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charge of antinomianism was actually centered on specific challenges 
made by individuals within the settlement to a collective sense of 
religious authority, embodied, mainly, in certain cries for a more fluid 
sense of identity and less doctrinal rigidity.8  Colonists such as John 
Cotton advocated a ‘free grace theology’ that seemed to other, more 
conservative members, to be a deviation from the rule of the colony and 
an assault upon its values and governing norms.  Here, the conclusions 
drawn by some of the ‘antinomian’ participants such as Cotton were 
merely that society should be more tolerant of those who diverged from 
normative (religious) identities, in many ways, the real issue that brought 
about the desires for and charges of antinomianism.  With this general 
tendency of antinomian thought in mind, we witness this particular 
movement’s propensity toward ecumenical undertakings, such as in 
Rhode Island where the persecuted Anne Hutchinson—the main figure 
in this particular controversy besides Cotton—sought refuge under the 
guidance of a man who was tolerant of all religions, Roger Williams.9
 What such cases demonstrate is that antinomianism, in large 
measure as perceived throughout the 17th Century, was understood as 
an almost entirely polemical construct, that which was synonymous 
with whatever “provoked fears of authority undermined.”10  Though 
the doctrinal issues with its ‘adherents’ were often framed as being 
involved with—once again as is typical within the Christian tradition—
the theological (or perhaps more accurately, theoretical) tension between 
grace and works, the political implications of such tensions were where 
the real issues were more often to be found.
 What is interesting to consider on this point, and what I am 
trying to center this essay on, is the manner in which antinomianism, or 
simply a desire to be free of certain rigid structures within Christendom, 
doctrine or perhaps even religion itself, in reality appears as a position 
determined within very specific historical and contextual political 
configurations that are in ever greater need of being comprehended as 
political challenges to rival authorities.  That is, I am trying to establish 
antinomianism as revolutionary or reform-oriented movements arising 
from within a given normative framework.  These are movements, 
8  Breen 2001, 55.
9  See MacCulloch 2009, 722-723.  For more on the context of antinomianism in the early 
English-American Puritan colonial scene, see also Stoever 1978; Winship 2002; as well as, in an Eng-
lish context, Cooper 2001; and Huehns 1951.
10  Cooper 2001, 36.
moreover, that occur with some frequency within Christian theology, 
whether we label them as fundamentally antinomian impulses or 
not.  Such a reworking of the standard theological definition of 
antinomianism11 might enable us, therefore, to discern why the 
opposition to antinomianism—a movement characteristically ascribed 
in the Nineteenth Century, for example, to certain groups of Reformers, 
particularly Calvinists, who sought justification by faith alone—was 
itself often fervent, something even John Henry Newman admired in 
one’s theological position.12
 We might pause to consider as well, and as would later become 
pronounced in a Danish context, the Lutheran theologian Søren 
Kierkegaard’s efforts to become contemporary with Christ (contra 
history, contra Hegel) through faith alone, which, ultimately, became an 
essential feature of his critique of the structures of Christendom that 
grounded Europe in his day.  It was as if, for Kierkegaard, to mount such 
a large scale attack upon the seductive allegiance of Church and state, 
and its ‘rule’ of accepting all citizens as automatically Christian, he 
was required to restore Luther’s simplified vision of a faith that moved 
beyond certain authoritative structures of faith.13  As such, and though 
he may not have been labeled as an antinomian during his time14, his 
theological position, I would claim, reflected the same fundamental 
essence of protest as earlier antinomians—something that will occur 
again and again in other theologian’s efforts as we will see.  Indeed, the 
very notion that one would be able to ‘suspend’ ethical normativity at all, 
as he famously claimed in his reading of Abraham’s near sacrifice of his 
son Isaac, calls to mind just such a possibility.15
11  From the late Nineteenth Century’s Century Dictionary, here quoted in the ‘Introduction by 
the Editor’ to Adams 1894), 12-13: the Antinomian is 
[…] one who maintains that Christians are freed from the moral law, as set forth in the Old Testament, by the new 
dispensation of grace as set forth in the gospel; an opponent of legalism in morals.  Antinomianism has existed in 
three forms: in the early church, as a species of Gnosticism, in the doctrine that sin is an incident of the body, and 
that a regenerate soul cannot sin; later, in the Reformation, as a reaction against the doctrine of good works in the 
Roman Catholic Church, in the antagonistic doctrine that man is saved by faith alone, regardless of his obedience 
to or disobedience of the moral law as a rule of life; finally, as a phase of extreme Calvinism, in English Puritan 
theology, in the doctrine that the sins of the elect are so transferred to Christ that they become his transgressions, 
and cease to be the transgressions of the actual sinner.
12  Newman 1994, 26.
13  See, among other writings, Kierkegaard 1968.
14  I will, however, note here how Paul Martens has referred to Kierkegaard’s ‘Lutheran and 
antinomian roots,’ in Martens 2010, 94.
15  See Kierkegaard 1983.
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 This same impulse to suspend the mechanisms of normativity 
(i.e. law, structure, institution) was present, I would also argue, when 
the Lutheran pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer sought to oppose the National 
Socialist movement in his Germany of the early Twentieth Century.  
He too strove to detach his faith in Christ from the structures of 
institutionalized Christianity, offering instead both a strong critique of 
those Christians who hope to receive grace from some form of legalistic 
thinking (“cheap grace”16) and his eventual hope in a “religionless” 
Christianity whose shape and contours he could not quite yet make 
out, but which he believed to be essential to the liberation of the human 
being from the worldly, political confines that held it.17  It is little surprise 
that his critique of religion was paralleled by those of both Karl Barth 
and Simone Weil, two thinkers whose own experiences of the early 
Twentieth Century in Europe were also marked by the rise of institutional 
authorities, both political and ecclesial, that gave them cause to rethink 
their relationships with religion and Church.  My point here is not to 
suggest that these authors were all antinomian, but to stress that 
their theologies bore traces of this anti-structural, anti-institutional 
impulse that is hard to disentangle from ‘antinomian’ thought in general, 
whatever such a thing, in reality, actually is.18
 In a sense, what these writers, among others, have been 
gravitating toward, I am claiming, is the original Lutheran intuition taken 
to its inevitable conclusion by its internal (read or mis-read as based 
in the Reformation) antinomian impulses, which were really, in many 
ways, the original Pauline vision of a faith in Christ that de-stabilizes 
but does not entirely do away with the institutionalized structures of the 
religious body out of which these desires spring.  For Paul, of course, 
and we would do well to recall this here, the desire to be apart from the 
law was one that rendered all normative identities as void (e.g. Galatians 
3:28), but which also allowed Paul, for one, to live within such normative 
cultural and religious divisions ‘as if’ they were not (1 Corinthians 
16  Bonhoeffer 2003. 
17  See Bonhoeffer 2010. 
18  One can also perhaps see something similar in those many persons today who claim to be 
‘spiritual but not religious’, and who are looking for a way to find harmony with the ‘sacred’ while break-
ing free of the ‘old’ trappings of what is often perceived as mere religious authority.  Such formed senti-
ments speak immediately—that is, without mediation, as Luther might once have put it—to many people 
who are searching for an alternate way to transcend their situation, and whose hopes are captured in 
the title of Diana Butler Bass’ more recent, and popular book Christianity After Religion: The End of the 
Church and the Birth of a New Spiritual Awakening.  Bass 2012.
7:17-24).  In many ways, this tension is still one that we are trying to 
comprehend and live out today in theological, political and philosophical 
terms, though we often fail to do just that; it is a project committed to 
the difficult, but necessary task of living “[…] a love that accomplishes 
what the law cannot: justice that endures for each and all.”19  This is 
a point to which I will return in a moment when I look at Heidegger’s 
reading of the foundational claims of Christianity.
 What these modern and even Pauline examples suggest to us is 
that the same ‘antinomian’ impulse that once ignited the righteous vigor 
of Johann Agricola was probably something latent within Luther’s own 
objections to the Roman Catholic Church of his time, but which was, 
for Luther himself, something that necessarily needed to be tempered 
with structure and law in order for the Reformation to have any traction 
as an institutional movement in its own right.  This would explain, 
on the one hand, why Luther had to resist such impulses, yet, on the 
other, why his own reforming tendencies were potentially mistaken as 
antinomian, why the antinomian impulse still refuses to go away and 
yet why it also cannot be embodied as a free-standing ecclesiastical 
structure.  In this case, it would seem as if Hannah Arendt’s maxim that 
the real trick with a revolutionary movement is finding the right institution 
in which to place it could be here reread in its antinomian version: 
the real trick with an antinomian movement is realizing that there is 
no institution in which to place it, because it already exists within every 
institution.20  If this strikes us as revealing the heart of deconstructive 
thought and its forever spectral messianism, I would only suggest that 
this is no coincidence at all, and that Derrida’s reluctance to take on any 
permanent label, including that of the Jew or the Christian, resides in 
such an understanding of the resonance between antinomian thought 
and deconstructivist thought.21
 To illustrate the depths to which contemporary thought has been 
interwoven with antinomianism, I want to turn in the next section to the 
treatment of the topic in the works of both Michel Foucault and Martin 
Heidegger.  Though my analysis will be frustratingly brief, what I hope to 
evidence is the resonance which both thinkers had with antinomianism, 
and how such a placement of their thought within the history I have 
19  Jennings 2013, 214.
20  See the conclusions drawn in Arendt 1963.
21  See, among others, Jennings 2005.
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already sketched above might further illuminate the contours of 
antinomian thinking within the West.
On Foucault, Heidegger, historicity and the potential 
uniqueness of Christianity
Perhaps one way to try to understand the position of those 
who feel inclined to defend an orthodox vision of the faith against 
its antinomian or nihilist threats is to reflect upon the ways in which 
their own efforts are more than simply mirrored by general national 
and military defenses of society.  They, in fact, rest upon the same 
premises, ones that often go undisclosed as substantially the same in 
their foundational principles.  It might prove very helpful in this respect 
to look to the analysis offered in Michel Foucault’s 1975-1976 lectures, 
titled as “Society Must Be Defended,” for it is in these lectures on the 
nature of power in society that Foucault was able to isolate a number of 
significant principles that undergird the defense of society: authority, 
law, antagonism and war, among others.22  His analysis of these general, 
but foundational terms, all of which are similarly functional within 
the analysis of antinomianism in the present essay, quickly leads us 
to confront the major dynamics of the Reformation with an ear tuned 
toward how such interactions continue to shape the fields of politics, 
theology and philosophy today.
 The doctrine of faith, as the Reformers soon discovered, and as 
Foucault places under evaluation in this context, was directly rooted in 
their relationship to the sole authority of the Bible.  The principle of sola 
scriptura functioned thereby at times as much as a political ideology as 
it was a religious belief in revelation.  As Foucault reminds us,  “[…] it 
must not be forgotten that, at least from the second half of the Middle 
Ages onward, the Bible was the great form for the articulation of the 
religious, moral, and political protests against the power of kings and 
the despotism of the church […];” as such, he continued, “The Bible 
was the weapon of poverty and insurrection; it was the world that made 
men rise up against the law and against glory, against the unjust law 
of kings and beautiful glory of the Church.”23  What the sole authority 
of the biblical text offered its believers was an apparently unmediated 
access to the divine that circumvented the hierarchical authority of an 
22  Foucault 2003.
23  Ibid., 71.
institutionalized world, politically and ecclesiastically, what has also 
motivated, as we have already seen, a good deal of its ‘antinomian’ 
flavor.  
 With the Reformation, as it were, a new way of recording history 
was conceived, one more capable of utilizing ambiguous historical 
accounts in order to provide a ‘counter-history’ to the more or less 
‘official’ history as written by those in power, a counter-history that 
would often appear in its new spectral form as an antinomian impulse, 
as I have been contending throughout.  Christianity, in Foucault’s 
estimation, began to realize (again, hence its re-formation) its potential 
to move counter to the currents of history and to resist those worldly 
powers that governed historically, though it was also, at times, 
complicit with certain political powers in order to achieve its own global 
hegemony, something, I have already noted, that also pervaded Luther’s 
own stance in relation to political force and use of the ‘sword.’
 Foucault, therefore, contrasts a form of history that merely 
sustains the rituals of sovereign power with a form of history that 
undoes such schemes of power within recorded history, what is for 
him part of the legacy of Christianity—whether actualized or not within 
history—and especially as it is seized upon by the Protestant Reformers. 
This, as I have already described, is what motivates the ‘antinomian’ 
impulse nearly entirely:
Historical discourse of the Rome type pacifies society, justifies 
power, and founds the order […] that constitutes the social body.  In 
contrast, the discourse I am telling you about, and which is deployed in 
the late sixteenth century, and which can be described as a biblical-style 
historical discourse, tears society apart and speaks of legitimate rights 
solely in order to declare war on laws.24
What Foucault makes clear, though he does not invoke the 
term ‘antinomianism’ directly as a movement per se or by name, is 
the struggle (‘war’) against law that typifies political revolutionary 
movements, and which is inherently part of the Christian message of 
grace (‘contra’ law) even if it is latent or only spectral at times (i.e. as 
an antinomian impulse only, and hence my preference for this term).  In 
the end, whether we call such phenomena antinomian or not, what we 
are assessing here is the presence of internal tensions that threaten to 
24  Ibid., 73.
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deconstruct specific institutionalized and politicized forms which are 
rooted somewhere in the event of Christ and which are permanently 
bound up with Christianity itself.
 Though I am arguing that this counter-historical impulse runs 
much deeper than Foucault’s genealogical analysis of the Protestant 
Reformation, he does touch upon the core dynamic that motivates and 
defines the antinomian, counter-historical protest against the structures 
(‘laws’) that be.  Underscoring his major thesis within this series of 
lectures, he affirms how “History gave us the idea that we are at war; 
and we wage war through history.”25  Antinomianism, it would seem, 
is simply one side of this apparently perpetual war taking place within 
history, for the representation of history.  Since there is no ‘nature, 
order, or peace’ at the ‘origins’ of the historical record, there is only a 
mass of ambiguity that must be debated, and in, more or less, explicitly 
political terms.
 What Foucault was pointing toward through his genealogy 
of a political protest against governing authority dependent upon its 
relationship to scripture alone, I am arguing, is what Martin Heidegger 
had also already been exploring many years prior to Foucault in his 
lectures on The Phenomenology of Religious Life, lectures which shed 
much light on the project of illuminating the influence of Christian 
thought upon the early stages of Heidegger’s work as well.26  What 
I want to suggest—and this will help illuminate why I am turning 
to Heidegger—is that the counter-historical impulse found within 
antinomian thought is the same impulse that generated Christianity’s 
originary impulse in relation to the Law of Judaism, and is what, in a 
theoretical sense, initiated a ‘revolutionary’ break from Judaic Law that 
could not yet sever itself entirely from (religious) structured forms if it 
was to exist as a religion in its own right throughout history.  
 I realize, of course, that this claim is a difficult one to prove, 
as the form of Christianity that has been passed down through the 
centuries is not a permanently antinomian one.  By definition, such 
a thing would not even be possible to identify as a structural form.  
That is, purely antinomian messianic movements have a tendency to 
die out very quickly unless they reinscribe themselves back within an 
institutionalized, normative framework—the compromise that both 
25  Ibid., 172.
26  See, for a thorough exposition of Heidegger’s early Christian influence, Kisiel 1993.
Luther and the earliest Christians, among others, had to make as well.  
Institutionalization (or representation itself then) is, in many ways, the 
zero level of hermeneutics that is necessary for religious identity to be 
conceived at all.27  
It is also a difficult claim to establish in light of Christianity’s 
long-standing hostility toward Judaism as well as Heidegger’s own 
anti-Semitic statements.  Yet Heidegger’s lectures on the uniqueness 
of Christianity in relation to history and historicity are directly relevant 
to the point I am trying to make, for it is in these lectures that he 
demonstrates how antinomianism is not a deviation from the Christian 
norm, but rather a recurring symptom of unjust representations of 
the Christ event within a more normative form of Christianity.  What 
Heidegger advances in this context is an analysis of Christ’s critical 
stance taken toward all those structures that characterize our world—a 
form of antinomianism in philosophical terms par excellence, and, 
consequently, well worth our attention, even if Heidegger himself was 
not able to digest the full consequences of this message in relation to 
his own views on Judaism.
 Christopher Rickey has already, I believe, correctly identified this 
tendency in Heidegger’s thought as a Lutheran-inspired antinomian 
impulse that lay underneath Heidegger’s larger (theo)political project, 
and as that which motivated a good deal of ‘postmodern’ thought 
that came after it, presumably figures such as Derrida and Agamben 
included.28  Rather than draw only a sharp critique of Heidegger’s 
alleged antinomianism, as Rickey tends toward, I would like to draw 
out some of these antinomian tendencies in Heidegger’s thought in 
order to demonstrate how this particular Christian-Lutheran strand of 
reasoning might actually be part of a larger hermeneutics of religious 
27  The impetus for such a balanced approach, for example, can be found in the work of David 
Novak, who, in an article addressing the fundamental basis of antinomian thought, declared that Chris-
tians should cease labelling Jews as legalists, and Jews, for their part, should cease to call Christians 
antinomian.  As he put it, “At the key point of human action, both of these extremes substitute man for 
God by replacing the divine with the human.  The legalist errs by placing the kingdom of God in human 
hands; the antinomian errs by denying there is any kingdom at all in his or her radical individualism.  
The Rabbis saw antinomianism at the heart of the rejection of God’s authority.  The antinomian lives in 
an ultimately absurd universe […].”  Novak 2000, 280.  His solution is to point out the manner in which 
both Jews and Christians adhere to the law of God, though they may differ on what exactly such an 
adherence in reality resembles.
28  Rickey 2002.
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representation in general, though one still severely misunderstood.29
 For example, as Heidegger bluntly puts it within these lectures: 
“Christian worldview: [this is] actually a contradiction!  It does not 
arise from a complex of a historical kind, like the Christian.”30  The 
Christian, from this point of view, somehow eludes being a historical 
figure akin to all other historical figures, and this, according to 
Heidegger, is for a particular reason: the Christian relation to form itself 
is one that cautions the Christian to not be conformed to this world 
at all (e.g. Romans 12.2).31  History involves itself in a certain action 
of ‘worldization’ (Verweltlichung) as an attempt to secure oneself by 
‘worldly’ means within this world.32  Yet, as Heidegger outlines in his 
lectures, 
There is no security for Christian life; the constant insecurity 
is also characteristic for what is fundamentally significant in factical 
life.  The uncertainty is not coincidental; rather it is necessary.  This 
necessity is not a logical one, nor is it of natural necessity.  In order to 
see this clearly, one must reflect on one’s own life and its enactment.33
It is the Christian identity, then, which finds itself continuously 
‘insecure’ within history, insecure with history itself.  At the very moment 
in which Christianity declares itself to be a religion wherein the divine 
is particularly wedded to the historical in an essential fashion (i.e. 
the Incarnation), it simultaneously also critiques one’s relation to any 
historical act of ‘worldization’, and to history itself as a consequence.  
There is no single, monolithic History within the Christian narrative, 
or for the Christian per se—a fact that Christians, throughout the 
centuries, have often misunderstood in their attempts to sacralize a 
particular historical or social narrative.  We might even suggest that 
29  There is no doubt that any reading of Heidegger’s take on anything like antinomianism will 
have to be read alongside his anti-Semitic remarks, which, with the publication of his Schwarzen Hefte, 
will only become a more prominent issue in upcoming years.  My reading of his antinomianism at pres-
ent, however, is one attempting to be in line with Jacob Taubes’ reading of the difference between Juda-
ism and Christianity that clearly resonates with certain aspects of Heidegger’s formulation of Christianity. 
See Taubes 2010.
30  Heidegger 2004, 87.
31  Ibid., 85-86.
32  Ibid., 23.
33  Ibid., 73.
Heidegger himself, in his alignment with National Socialism, at some 
points succumbed to this temptation.34
 What can be sensed underlying this bold, but renewing, 
hypothesis on the Christian’s relation to history is the radical 
presence of Christ (or of God more generally), that promises to allow 
one to transcend history and that is the experience of God beyond 
all authoritative norms.  This is the presence of God (parousia) that 
comports one toward God, according to Heidegger, and which causes 
a turning away from the worldly (or, the idolatrous), prompting one to 
not be concerned about the specifics of Christ’s return, but rather to be 
concerned with one’s awakening as a form of sobriety.35  Heidegger’s 
rereading of the Christian’s identity is an existential redefining of the 
Christian in such a way that this identity can be seen to permeate any 
situation in which one finds oneself prior to the proclamation of the 
Gospels within any normative construction of identity, yet completely 
transformed—continuously transformed—from within.  In this sense, 
and echoing Pauline thought rather heavily, nothing changes in one’s 
identity, though everything, surely, also changes radically.
 What is doubly intriguing on this point are Heidegger’s 
suggestions made regarding Christianity’s permanent unsettling 
of historical identity, in that he reads such a position as one yet 
constitutive of identity as such, as foundational of such identifying 
structural formations.  This understanding is what will allow him, within 
these same lectures, to conceive of the non-philosophical foundations 
of philosophy—the point we must return to again and again if we are 
really to critique the exclusively rational grounds of modern thought 
(what Hütter, as much as John Henry Newman, had really been trying 
to do, and which I am also trying to do, though in a slightly different 
manner).  
 In ways that might be said to foreshadow Deleuze and Guattari’s 
portrayal of the non-philosophical within the philosophical,36 Heidegger 
suggests that “The historical is the phenomenon that for us should 
open up an access to the self-understanding of philosophy,” though 
Christianity seems to be somehow outside this particular philosophical 
understanding, though, also, at the same time, at its foundations, even 
34  See Slavoj Žižek’s comments on Heidegger and National Socialism in Žižek 1999, 9-66.
35 Ibid., 74.
36  Deleuze and Guattari 1996.
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granting it a foundation.37  It would seem, based on his conclusion to the 
lectures, that it is Christianity which best enables one to gain some 
distance from the processes of worldization—to become attuned to a 
radical comportment to the world that re-determines one’s lived sense 
of temporality, but which is yet, somehow, also characteristic of a fuller 
experience of temporality.  This is what it means, he suggests, when 
he states that “Christian experience lives time itself,” just as the non-
philosophical lives the philosophical as one facet of the experience 
of human existence, though not exclusively, as that which is solely 
constituent of human experience.38  
 We arrive hence at this most curious conclusion to Heidegger’s 
lectures, something which needs to be rethought in relation to 
contemporary philosophical ‘returns to religion’ within certain 
continental circles:  
Real philosophy of religion arises not from preconceived concepts 
of philosophy and religion.  Rather, the possibility of its philosophical 
understanding arises out of a certain religiosity—for us, the Christian 
religiosity.  Why exactly the Christian religiosity lies in the focus of 
our study, that is a difficult question; it is answerable only through the 
solution of the problem of the historical connections.  The task is to 
gain a real and original relationship to history, which is to be explicated 
from out of our own historical situation and facticity.  At issue is what 
the sense of history can signify for us, so that the ‘objectivity’ of the 
historical ‘in itself’ disappears.  History exists only from out of a present. 
Only thus can the possibility of a philosophy of religion be begun.39
Or, from the perspective I have been taking in this article, why 
should we return to the issue of antinomianism again?  My answer, pace 
Heidegger, is now hopefully clear: such a tension between structure 
and experience, as stereotypically represented by the tension between 
Judaism’s Law and Christianity’s antinomianism (its ‘grace,’ as it were), 
is what is inherent to identity itself—and therefore not just Christian or 
just Jewish identity.  This lesson, which Heidegger himself, we must 
note, did not fully subscribe to ‘all the way down’ to its core, was what 
37  Heidegger 2004, 24.
38  Ibid., 57.
39  Ibid., 89.
must be repeated as constitutive of all identities (religious, political or 
otherwise), not dismissed or critiqued out of existence altogether.
 Christianity, for its part, certainly found itself asserting an 
identity that emphasized the antinomian impulse as it arises from out 
of an event that appears as an ever ‘pure present’, the faith that exceeds 
any nomos which exists as an already given structure.  The structural 
forms of Christianity that arose shortly after Jesus’ death certainly 
emphasized it, though whether or not this was Jesus’ intention—as he 
himself seemed content to present his message fully within the Jewish 
traditions—is another question, and one very well worth pursuing.40  
Historically, however, as a phenomenon of the evolution of identity 
within its own right, Christianity itself, as a reform movement internal 
to Judaism, and so which in a sense also never ceases being a Jewish 
movement, seems to capture the antinomian impulse perfectly, and is, 
consequently, ‘doomed’ to repeat it over and again as essential and 
constitutive of its own identity.41
 Perhaps a more conducive perspective for the practice of 
theology would be to admit the necessity for structural antinomian 
impulses within both Jewish and Christian faiths and not to shy away 
from their existence. Rather, we might learn to read these symptoms 
of structural unease as moments for the potential liberation of, and 
increased justice rendered toward, subjects who will always be 
40  Perhaps this is why the Freudian hypothesis takes on such significance in Gershom Scho-
lem’s and Jacob Taubes’ readings of it.  Freud’s hypothesis, for better or worse, was that Judaism did 
not, or could not, emphasize its own internal pluralistic elements—i.e. its alleged Egyptian origins, ac-
cording to Freud, though this hypothesis should serve as only an almost metaphorical example of what 
was really at stake here.  See Taubes 2003.  See also Freud 1939.  What I am suggesting here is that 
this ability to avow and disavow one’s foundations, which Freud essentially claims, is akin to John Ca-
puto’s development of a ‘religion without religion’—a privilege not accorded the more tradition-adhering 
sides of any institution or religion—perhaps provides us in some measure with a direct view of the true 
nature and function of antinomian thought, that which seemingly continues to motivate each ‘new’ burst 
of Christian messianic fervor, from Paul to Luther, and from Kierkegaard to Caputo (whom I will address 
directly in a moment).  
41  Though, certainly in light of the present publication of Heidegger’s Schwarze Hefte (‘Black 
Notebooks’), much remains to be said on Heidegger’s stance vis-à-vis Judaism and its apparent 
‘worldlessness’ or ‘deworlding of the world’ which is bound up with his own difficult ‘ontological-historical 
antisemitism’, I am here suggesting that there is perhaps a shared tension within Heidegger’s own work 
between both Christians and Jews with regard to their identity formation in relation to their being-in-
the-world.  Though Heidegger himself does not in the context of his lectures on Christianity advance a 
parallel between these two religions, and in fact exploits Christianity in favor of his reading of Judaism 
in other places, I yet believe that his work does point out the inherent structural tensions within Judaism 
which he himself was not able to further theorize with regard to the historical religions of Judaism and 
Christianity.  My thesis, then, is that both Christianity and Judaism engage in a certain ‘worldlessness’ 
that must be valued as a necessary part of identity formation in general.  On the anti-Semitism within the 
notebooks, see Gordon 2014.  
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‘normatively’ defined so to speak, and at times even unjustly oppressed.  
Accordingly, as much as this struggle is about the tensions that 
constitute identity—the tensions of the self permanently caught 
between an institutionalized structure and a private experience—it is 
also a struggle that contains a hope for more justice to be done to the 
particular individuals who continuously stand before us, asking us to 
recognize and even love them.42
Though I have spent a good deal of space narrating a brief 
history of antinomian tendencies since the Reformation, I want, in what 
follows, to demonstrate how the specter of antinomianism—for it is 
little more than a permanent specter that haunts traditional ecclesial 
and theological structures and discourses—is still a major, and often 
undisclosed, problematic within theological and philosophical reflection 
and praxis.43  The current situation is as if the antinomian impulse were 
more formalized so to speak; charges of its heresy are certainly less 
frequent, more vague, though the desire to present a love, an encounter, 
an ethics, or a person, all beyond the structures of the law (thus altering 
our coordinates of identity in general) becomes that much more forceful 
in a modern context.  To illustrate this point, I will next move on to 
examine two impasses within contemporary thought that both turn, in 
their more ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ versions alike, on their desires to 
resolve the ‘antinomian problem’.
Two contemporary responses to antinomianism
The first antinomian position in contemporary thought: 
An impasse
As with both Paul and Luther, these readings of antinomianism 
do not carefully distinguish between religious, cultural or political 
antinomianism, but, rather, implicitly perceive that all of these forms 
go together in an undisclosed sense.  This is the case, as well, 
and, perhaps, more directly so, with the first antinomian position in 
contemporary thought that I wish here to take up.  It is the one we could 
more or less label the ‘conservative’ position, one characterized by its 
defensive reaction to what appears, to it, as an antinomian threat made 
42  On this dialectic between structure and experience, see Malabou 2010, 81.
43  For an astute analysis of these tensions as they are played out in the field of theological 
discourse, see Taylor 2011.
in relation to the given normative structures of both the Christian faith 
and (a western, Christianized) society as a whole.  
 In a relatively recent article in First Things, R.R. Reno embodies 
the contours of this approach through his insistence upon the necessity, 
for the genuine expression of faith, of eradicating such antinomian 
flourishes that lead, not just the Church or theology, but society as a 
whole, down the primrose path to its moral demise.  He summarizes 
the stakes in critical proximity to liberal Protestant trends: ‘Modern 
Protestantism does not have a monopoly on antinomianism.  Various 
versions of postmodern cultural theory rest on similar assumptions and 
also lead to condemnations of law and endorsements of spontaneity.”44  
Indeed, even ‘spontaneity’ itself is seemingly condemned as an aberrant 
product of the deviation from social and religious normativity.
 What I want to pay attention to here, and ultimately insofar as it 
supports the overall thesis of this essay, is how Reno detects this same 
antinomian impulse as present even within theological movements that 
do not recognize such a label, and as he detects them as inherently part 
of the dynamic that drives an ongoing Protestant Reformation of all 
structures.  In this way, I would suggest, he is correctly attentive to the 
real issues underlying antinomian thought, though, perhaps, wrong in 
his diagnosis of the larger problematic, as we will see.  Reno is, however, 
careful to outline exactly how such a situation arose in our western 
world today, as he suggests that 
Luther failed to put an end to the antinomian temptation, and today 
it seems irresistible.  Influential mid-twentieth-century theologians such 
as Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich translated the Reformation doctrine 
of justification by faith alone into an abstract principle that they used to 
critique and deconstruct all forms of religious authority.45  
His invective against Bultmann, Tillich, and even the more 
contemporary philosopher Gianni Vattimo (though a host of other 
‘postmodern’ thinkers linger underneath his highly critical words), 
would seem to be centered on defending the ‘normativity’ of tradition 
against its disintegration at the hands of ‘postmodern’ theorists, for 
44  Reno 2012, 34.
45  Ibid., 34.
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whom “It’s a sin to be any-kind-of-normative.”46  It is also, presumably, 
his job then to uphold such normative measures—which would also 
include the denunciation, in the same article, of transgendered persons 
as ‘disordered’—all in the defense of a (structurally) genuine faith.  
 Rather than respond directly to Reno’s claims—something I do 
not feel would advance the argument very far, for, in his schema, you 
are either a Christian connected to the genuine faith or a postmodern, 
antinomian, and potential nihilist cast into the darkness of a lawless 
world—I want to turn to a more academic exposition of the problem from 
another First Things contributor, Reinhard Hütter, a theologian who also 
senses perils latent within the fragmentation of our world today.47  
 For Hütter, though sharing a good deal in common on this 
score with Reno, the legacy of the ‘Protestant antinomian captivity’ 
that still drifts throughout Christianity today and which has potentially 
major ‘ecumenical dimensions’ for the Church, is one that needs to be 
disclosed for what it is and pulled up at the root.48  In his estimation, 
the seduction of modernity’s embrace of the subject’s autonomy has 
led humanity down the path toward a particular form of ‘freedom’ that 
ends up more closely resembling nihilism in that it neglects the reality 
that “True moral autonomy consists in the free submission under and 
obedience to God’s moral law.”49  Hence, the real underlying problem 
with Christianity today, but also with society if one frames it in such a 
way, is that its true antinomian flavor is one that neglects the normativity 
of the moral law within, and the subject suffers as a result.
 Hütter’s essential claim is that humanity has sought freedom 
“only in a very incipient and fundamentally incomplete way,” through 
its restriction of natural law to reason alone, and this would serve to 
explain, in due measure, why his account of modernity and freedom 
must run through a usual list of suspects: Kant, Fichte, and Nietzsche.  
By framing his critique as a condemnation of such divergent viewpoints 
as each ‘founder’ of modernity presents us with, his analysis is, in some 
sense, postured in order to introduce his interpretations of Aquinas and 
John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis Splendor as those dei ex machina which 
46  Ibid.
47  See, for example, Hütter 2011, 37-41.
48  Hütter 2001, 122.
49  Ibid., 130.
serve to rescue natural law as an innate moral (eternal) law.50  As such, 
the law, whose “paradigmatic example” is Christ, is now capable of 
performing “a liminal service that protects genuine freedom from being 
reinterpreted as license and thus from losing the good by itself defining 
the good and evil and consequently losing itself.”51
 Though Hütter does not take up an account of conscience as a 
form of natural law or even natural religious sentiment—as John Henry 
Newman might otherwise have put it, and thus as a natural religious 
element within all of humanity, whether one recognizes God in it or 
not—he does drive home the fundamental point of his response to 
antinomian initiatives within modern Protestant thought, offering his 
critique with a series of suggestive points addressed directly to his 
question of whether “genuine human freedom as constituted in Christ 
can be gravely endangered, deeply distorted, and ultimately destroyed 
by particular kinds of acts”—though he does not name these acts 
as such.  What he does pronounce, however, is sentence upon this 
antinomian captivity of Protestantism via his charge that it subverts true 
freedom and enslaves the soul to a lawless and ignorant wandering from 
God:
Might it be that contemporary Protestant theology lacks the very 
conceptuality even to recognize this question as a challenge, since it 
is bereft of a theology of the law that would complement and shape the 
inflated and rarely reflected use of the notion of ‘freedom?’  In short, 
could it be that much of contemporary Protestantism is unable even to 
acknowledge that there is a challenge because of an antinomianism that 
has become so thoroughly taken for granted that any awareness—not to 
mention critical self-awareness—of the tacit antinomian commitments, 
deeply engrained in most of contemporary Protestantism, has been 
lost?52
The threat of antinomianism, by this count, is really double, 
because not only is it all pervasive within contemporary Protestantism, 
but, moreover, it continues to act unimpeded and unrecognized for 
what it is.  Hence, there is much practical deviance to be discerned 
50  See also his extended discussion of Aquinas in relation to the moral law in Hütter 2012.
51  Hütter 2001, 135.
52  Ibid., 137.
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in the nature of the Protestant Church today behind Hütter’s claim 
of an “antinomian fallacy of a Protestantism without the Law”—the 
fundamentally flawed notion which even Luther himself sought to 
overcome and which, presumably, has infiltrated every ecclesial 
structure at some level.  
 Hütter’s argument is repeatedly insistent upon the fact that 
neither Aquinas, Luther, Melanchthon nor Calvin reject the rule of 
natural law, and that a recovery of such an innate moral law can actually 
reactivate a cultural and even political landscape, one that ‘political 
liberalism’ fails to achieve through its indebtedness to certain forms 
of ‘antinomian Protestantism.’53  Yet, what Hütter’s account lacks, I 
would argue, is its own critical self-awareness of the manner in which 
certain justifications of natural law are inherently and inextricably 
linked to forms of sovereign power.  Just who determines what is and 
what is not ‘natural?’  On what grounds and through what contrasts 
with other ‘unnatural’ things?  Lest we forget, it was the difficulty of 
determining any ‘natural’ theology concretely in history that once led 
Jürgen Moltmann to define it as “[…] in actual truth theologia viatorum, 
an anticipation of the promised future in history as a result of obedient 
thinking,” and not as an originary foundational principle.54
 Moltmann’s subsequent call for a form of ‘permanent 
iconoclasm,’ as a sort of ongoing Reformation within the Church in tune 
with his ‘theology of hope’, may strike many as a somewhat ‘antinomian’ 
principle in-itself.55  What it offers us, however, is an opportunity to not 
get bogged down in quests for more originary ‘natural’ foundations that 
do not necessarily exist (or, at least, could never be clearly identified) 
in reality.  Though Hütter’s claims are carefully distinguished from 
modern forms of sovereign (‘autonomous’) subjectivity—something 
which he routinely condemns—they do at times resemble a pre-modern, 
almost medieval, notion of ‘sovereign unification’ of nature in that they 
assume the uncontested pre-existence of a normative, natural law.  
In this sense, Hütter’s claims, as with Reno’s, I am arguing, share in 
the modern quest to purify (reason or religion, it matters little which) 
53  Ibid., 147.
54  Moltmann 1993a, 90.
55  Moltmann 1993b, 87.
in order to attain legitimacy and political privilege.56  This implicit 
embrace of a pre-modern worldview invokes my hesitation to embrace 
this particular response to antinomianism in contemporary thought, 
for it is this response which seems to lack, what I would call, a fuller 
political theological—or, in Hütter’s formulation, critically self-aware—
account of those implicit or explicit theological positions that actually are 
utilized in order to re-inscribe certain theological claims within a nexus 
of (sovereign) political power, ones well invested in trying to achieve 
political privilege through their ‘naturalization’ of certain privileged 
institutions and persons (e.g. defending heterosexual marriage, strict 
male/female boundaries, etc.).  This position, in the end, results in a 
conservative ‘impasse’ that pits the truth of ‘true freedom’ versus the 
antinomian nihilist, and does nothing to consider the ways in which 
issues of justice are bound up within such tensions.
 What I wish to do next in this section, therefore, is to develop 
an alternate account of antinomian thought that does not perceive it 
as an obstacle to be overcome by a more genuine theological account 
of freedom; that is, one that does not seek to resuscitate a pre-modern 
form of political power, but, rather, an account that tries to embrace 
‘antinomianism’ as the only way to sustain truly critical thought—what 
will, perhaps only in appearance, be the ‘liberal’ alternative.  Beyond 
this, however, what I hope to demonstrate is that even this account, one 
that approaches the subject from an altogether opposed angle, still 
at times runs the risk of missing the larger, hermeneutical framework 
within which antinomian thought operates, and, therefore, might also 
fail to overcome the same impasse that the first option encountered, 
though from the other side as it were.  By demonstrating this second 
position alongside the first, however, I am ultimately aiming to try to 
gain access to another perspective on antinomianism altogether, one 
focused on the political theological elements always already at work within 
any given theological account of the law, and which are often used to 
justify political power and/or violent means to access (sovereign) power, 
though, as I hope to show, these means need not be utilized as such.  In 
order to do this, however, I must first examine what has become, from 
the other ‘liberal’ side of things, the second antinomian position in 
56  See the critique of such purification temptations in Latour 1993.  One could suggest that such 
a quest is particularly surprising, given that the essay is dedicated to Stanley Hauerwas, an advocate of 
Christian pacifism, and yet seems uncritically to advocate an adherence to social norms which may be 
at odds with Hauerwas’ position (e.g. the just war traditions put forth by each of the theologians Hütter 
wishes himself to champion).
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contemporary thought that, I believe, does not end in an impasse, but 
actually opens us up to further options beyond what appears to be a 
nihilistic end to all law.
The second antinomian position in contemporary thought:
Permanent reform
The temptation within certain theological voices today—Reno 
and Hütter in this instance, but also many others who strive to ‘defend’ 
theology from both modern and postmodern claims—is to either 
severely critique or outright dismiss postmodern philosophical theories 
as hell-bent on undermining the very foundations of Christian freedom 
as posited in the eternal, intractable moral law within us.  A typical 
‘liberal’ response to such ‘conservative’ and defensive posturing might 
then entail a radical openness to the antinomian impulse—something 
akin to the notorious ‘play of differences’ that postmodern thinkers such 
as Jacques Derrida appeared to many to revel in.
 For quite some time now, commentators on the work of the 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben have likewise struggled with his various 
attempts to ‘end’ the violence of representation and his insistence that 
there is a presentation beyond representation that is truly possible, if 
only we could learn to return ourselves properly to the ‘pure potentiality’ 
that resides within us.57  His remarks in this particular vein of thought 
show more than a passing affinity with those reformers who would 
advocate an end to all law.  His numerous comments upon the existence 
of the law and his desire to see the ‘transgression of the law as the only 
true fulfilment of the law’ have brought him into the company of other 
potential antinomian, messianic figures.  His repeated references to 
Sabbatai Zevi—the once heralded potential Jewish Messiah whose 
transgression of the Law, and eventual conversion to Islam—and others 
who appear to enjoy certain antinomian impulses, does little to avert 
charges of antinomianism in his thought.58  
 For Agamben, who has claimed to be out-deconstructing the 
master deconstructivist Derrida, the law exists as something to be 
cancelled out, or to be put to new, unintended uses that lessen its force, 
57  I expand upon these themes a great deal more in Dickinson 2011.
58  On the life and antinomian tendencies of Sabbatai Zevi, see Scholem 1973.  See also 
Taubes’ commentary on Scholem and Sabbatai Zevi in Taubes 2003.
as a child plays with an old passport.59  Such gestures are captured, 
in his opinion, perfectly through the Jewish figure of the Messiah, the 
one person who was to undo the normative force of the law altogether.60  
Referencing the incorporation of the messianic concept within Judaism, 
Christianity and Shiite Islam alike, Agamben demonstrates how each of 
these traditions understands the Messiah as signifying 
[…] the fulfillment and the complete consummation of the Law.  
In monotheism, messianism thus constitutes not simply one category 
of religious experience among others but rather the limit concept of 
religious experience in general, the point in which religious experience 
passes beyond itself and calls itself into question insofar as it is law 
(hence the messianic aporias concerning the Law that are expressed in 
both Paul’s Epistle to the Romans and the Sabbatian doctrine according 
to which the fulfillment of the Torah is its transgression).61  
Critical questions on this point that are put to Agamben seem to 
circulate around the same area: is he trying to access a place beyond the 
law?  Does he want anarchy to rule?  How are we, practically speaking, 
to take him seriously in this world of contracts and property disputes, 
etc.?  Or, in theological terms, should there be no Church anymore?62
 What is often mistaken by a variety of commentators upon 
Agamben’s work who see in his theoretical vision the dismantling of 
all law,63 is that Agamben, despite his being fully immersed within the 
‘postmodern’ milieu that should condemn him to the outer reaches of 
nihilistic despair, is actually searching for a way to restore a certain 
balance to the function of law within our world, to develop a form of 
‘perfect antinomianism’ that works from within the existence of law—as, 
then, inherent to the existence of the law itself in order to develop a new 
relationship to law.  Thanos Zartaloudis, for his part, has described this 
active perspective in Agamben’s work as exactly a form of antinomian 
thought:
59  See the conclusions reached in Agamben 1993.
60  This theme is pursued throughout Agamben 2005.
61  Agamben 1998, 56.  See also, the parallel formulation in Agamben 2000, 134-135.
62  Questions such as these are pursued at length, for example, in the essays gathered in Frost 
2013.
63  See, for example, the critique levied in Mills 2008.
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Perfect antinomianism is a force internal to the actuality of the 
law […] though not internal to the law, which inverses the latter’s 
effectiveness; it does not preserve the law as it is nor destroy it, nor 
does it create a new law to replace the old law, but it instead restores law 
to the sphere of pure means, and renders it free to common use.64  
The incessant tension between structural forms and an experience 
beyond those forms—what I have elsewhere looked at in this context as 
a permanent tension between canonical forms and messianic forces65—
does not inevitably lead to a complete (antinomian) rupture with tradition, 
but rather develops a hermeneutics, albeit a radicalized one, in response 
to the tension itself.  This, I suggest, is what we hear from Agamben’s 
own lips as he contemplates the existence of the Church in 2009, 
something which might have appeared as a shock to those who took him 
as an antinomian:
By placing origin and end in contact with one another, this force 
endlessly fulfils and ends time.  Let us call this force Law or State, 
dedicated as it is to economy, which is to say, dedicated as it is to 
the indefinite—and indeed infinite—governance of the world.  As for 
the second force, let us call it messiah, or Church; its economy is the 
economy of salvation, and by this token is essentially completed.  The 
only way that a community can form and last is if these poles are present 
and a dialectical tension between them prevails.66
Rather than espouse a radicalized, ‘one sided’ antinomian 
position, he attempts here, and contrary to those many voices that have 
sought to present his work as yet another endless deconstructivist play 
in differences, to preserve the tension between a structure, or law, and 
its antinomian, messianic force that serves to undo it, precisely in order 
to maintain the (normative) identity of a community.  Though many of 
his detractors might read his comments on antinomianism otherwise, I 
think it more fruitful to perceive this act of ‘deconstruction’ as one that, 
in the end, upholds our need for social structures and representations, 
while also finding a space for the ‘pure critique’ of such structures to 
64  Zartaloudis 2010, 300.
65  Dickinson 2013.
66  Agamben 2012, 34-35.
be pursued, which is, as Derrida himself might have put it, the only 
authentic way for a genuine justice to ever prevail.67 
 What we might also gain from such a reading of Agamben’s work 
is that such a dynamic was, indeed, present in the work of Derrida, who 
was, perhaps, more inclined to preserve normative, canonical structures 
than his detractors often realized—a fundamental part of his project 
to remain ever open to the horizon of justice potentially always before 
us.68  John Caputo, who might be taken as something of an exemplar 
here in refining this antinomian position—and this is what gets him 
in trouble with theologians such as John Milbank and presumably a 
good many more—follows Derrida’s lead in describing what he calls a 
‘religion without religion’, what could easily be construed as a form of 
contemporary antinomian thought, though which may have more going 
on within it in terms of identity establishment than might be noticed at 
first glance.69
 Caputo, maintaining Derrida’s insistence that all thought 
seemingly boils down to the tensions between a given structure (of 
thought, of politics, of ethics, of religion, etc.) and its inherent desires 
from within to ‘deconstruct’ the structure (i.e. its ‘autoimmunity’ he 
would say70), has attempted to write a theology of the event that plays 
precisely upon the structural ambivalence of all identifications in order to 
point the way toward a ‘radical, creative, and even sacred anarchy’ that 
promises only to both shake our identities to their core and thoroughly 
transform the structures that be within religion itself—though, for him, 
this is a task done in response to Christianity, or, more specifically, his 
own Catholic roots.71  It is also, however, and from the start, a political 
project all the way down, as he recognizes that such a reading of 
religious structures is bound to upset those looking to defend them.
 Caputo’s version of theology, likely to Hütter’s chagrin, “[…] 
exists in fragments and asides and apostrophes within confessional 
67  See, among numerous other references to justice in Derrida’s later work, Derrida 1994.
68  I would point to a curious interview with Derrida that is often neglected by his critics in which 
he explicitly, and repeatedly, defends such normative measures as canonical representations and liter-
ary canons in general.  See Derrida 1992.
69  See Caputo 1997.
70  See his numerous references to ‘autoimmunity’ in Derrida 2004.
71  Caputo 2013, 261.
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theology,”72  It is not a monolithic entity and it does not, as such, need 
anyone to defend it.  Contrary to the position of those more ‘orthodox’ 
theologians looking to label him as heretical, he feels, such a theology 
“[…] is testified to every time confessional theologians come under 
attack as heretics or atheists, whenever they touch a nerve in the powers 
that be that know their power is being put at risk.”73  Fully recognizing 
the dilemma he is attempting to address (and in this way sounding a bit 
like Luther once did), Caputo is not seeking to do away with structure 
completely—a point well worth underscoring at the moment, for it may 
offer us a chance to perceive this second position as less of an impasse 
and more of an opportunity in the end.  As he exclaims, the event of 
being contemporary with Christ, or God (much like Kierkegaard earlier) 
demands that we continuously reform the structures that be—social, 
political, religious, or otherwise—though we cannot do away with them 
altogether: “[…] the creedal structure is weakened in favor of the event 
while the creedal faith is not simply jettisoned, so one remains in the 
creedal structure, as if not.”74  Repeating Paul’s dictum that we remain 
in our current social standing ‘as if’ it were not what actually defines us, 
Caputo is attempting, I would suggest, to illuminate antinomian thought 
as a central and dynamic constitutive feature within (religious) identity in 
general.
 From Caputo’s perspective, and as a sort of answer to the 
apparent aporia we witnessed a moment ago in Agamben’s work, the 
solution to this ‘impasse’ is not to perceive deconstructionism, or 
postmodernism for that matter, or antinomianism—whatever these 
things truly are or are not—as a problem to be overcome, but simply 
as part of a larger, hermeneutical process that, in its entire scope, is 
seldom comprehended for what it truly is.  What I am contending is that 
we can neither simply dismiss nor fully embrace antinomian thought.  
Rather, we must learn to utilize it as a symptom of structural injustices 
that must be listened to as prime indicators for where genuine reform 
is needed.  Though this is a form of ‘radical hermeneutics’, it is not 
simply a nihilistic or absurd antinomianism: it is dialectical through and 
through.
 
72  Ibid., 62.
73  Ibid.
74  Ibid., 81.
Conclusions
In some ways, we might perceive antinomianism as the most 
ancient of heresies, or even blasphemies,75 Christianity’s foundational 
heresy in relation to Judaism’s Law, the reformer’s heresy in protest 
against the Catholic Church, or as the postmodern challenge to any 
given normative structure.  In this sense, the antinomian challenge 
is thoroughly political first and foremost, and should be understood 
as such.  As Benjamin Kaplan has pointed out was the case in early 
modern Europe, heresy and sedition, practically-speaking, went hand-
in-hand; toleration, by contrast, was an embarrassing, illegitimate 
position to hold.76  Antinomianism does not diverge from this reading 
of heresy, but, rather, outlines itself, as read through its history, as 
a significant feature of it.  We might thereby see antinomianism as 
the heresy that cannot be structurally concretized, and, as such, that 
which will never be wholly uprooted and removed.  For many, however, 
antinomianism simply remains the specter in the shadows that is feared 
but rarely understood.
 Accusations of antinomian heresy are for this reason often flung 
out from within such fearful and consequently distorted perspectives.  
Yet, what are we really to make of these heretical accusations?  For, as 
is typically the case in history, “The spectre of heresy among the people 
was a disturbing symbol of the unease aroused in the privileged by those 
on whom their privilege rested so heavily.”77  Heresy, as R.I. Moore has 
recently put it, is an ‘old weapon’ that does “not necessarily describe 
the beliefs of its targets more accurately.”78  Moreover, as he makes 
clear, those who generally combatted heresy as the chosen social and 
religious war most effective for propagating the faith, often, in reality, 
become “[…] adept at convincing themselves and each other that 
resistance to their authority, and to their noble and sincerely held ideal 
of Christian unity under the leadership of the church universal, was the 
work of the devil.  The measure of their achievement is that so many still 
believe it.”79
 The fear of rampant social and personal moral nihilism among 
75  Such is where Leonard W. Levy, for example, places antinomianism in Levy 1981.
76  Kaplan 2007, 124, 143.
77  Moore 2012, 330.  
78  Ibid., 273.
79  Ibid., 331.
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the mass of individuals within western society is, in many ways, I would 
suggest, simply the fear of one’s own internal antinomian impulses, 
which is really a fear of oneself, the power, anger and misguided 
authority that one is capable of wielding.  It is also an insecurity with 
not-knowing where one narrative will cease to exist and another will take 
over, the crossing of boundaries where real reformation does occur, 
but which is ‘good for the system’ as well.  One can never really embody 
an antinomian position as it has, by definition, no institutional form.  
Normative, institutionalized forms are yet all that we live our lives by, 
in the sense that they provide a shared sense of cultural intelligibility.  
We often fear, however, the trouble which antinomian thoughts inspire, 
and, consequently, have little comprehension of what such impulses 
might do to our reconstruction of normative measures.  Within such 
misdirected historical quests for Christian ‘unity,’ and especially in light 
of Christian anti-Semitic positions, the politics of exclusion become 
manifestly more important than doctrinal divergences, as friends and 
enemies alike are made upon such borders.  
 The question to ask at this point is: to what degree does a 
given tradition allow itself to listen to competing histories and to 
discern between them as to the merit of each (by their own strengths)?  
Or, to what degree does a tradition seek to present itself not as an 
inherently plural discourse in and of itself, but as a monolithic structure 
undivided from within by its own internal tensions?  The strength of 
a hermeneutical viewpoint on this score would be that it is capable of 
acknowledging its own fluctuations, pluralities and histories within its 
self-perspective.  That is, the more a given canonical representation 
allows its own repressed elements to be heard, the more justice it does 
to them, thus promoting a sense of a ‘happy memory.’80  As such, this 
is to envision multiple histories within any given tradition as already 
engaged in a political struggle to articulate themselves, and to affirm 
that this is how things should be, rather than trying to achieve a singular, 
static representation of History.  Such a schema means being attentive 
to the ‘weak messianic forces’ working within a given tradition, often 
mistaken as antinomian thoughts, but waiting to be seen at the precise 
moment when they are in need of being seen—therefore also as 
‘dangerous memories’ in Johann Baptist Metz’s sense of the term.81
80  On the concept of ‘happy memory,’ see Ricoeur 2004.
81  Metz 2007.
 Maybe what we are in need of is what Shaul Magid, in the context 
of exploring certain strands of Jewish antinomianism—which share 
a certain affinity with Agamben’s reading of Sabbati Zevi—refers to 
as a ‘dialectic of heresy,’ or “the very thing that enables a tradition to 
survive by expanding the boundaries of legitimacy in order to push the 
tradition towards its redemptive end.”82  What Magid identifies, and here 
merely bears repeating, is a task “[…] to legitimate and even sanctify 
the tension of living simultaneously inside and outside the law,” or that 
which would see antinomianism as an ally rather than an enemy in the 
never-ending quest for justice.83
 My efforts in this essay are not aimed at repeating the errors 
perhaps latent in Heidegger’s alleged antinomianism—something no 
doubt bound up with his anti-Jewish positions and that might be said to 
have been motivated by his effacing of the Hebraic tradition altogether 
from his thought84—but in returning, you might say, to Christianity 
as a form of Judaism itself, as that which arises from within its Hebraic 
heritage, and which, if it is to be true to itself, must in some sense 
return to its roots time and again.  What we are trying to move toward 
is a theological and philosophical reading of history and the forces that 
work from within it to undo it, not in order to identify and defuse their 
apparent threat, but to see them for what they can be for us, their value 
and also their beauty.  Rather than portray antinomianism as a threat 
to the system which needs to be removed, we can see it as a ‘weak 
messianic force’ moving through all constituted (religious) identities, 
not as the end of ‘Christianity’ as an organized religion, but its ‘original’ 
proclamation, ever in need of greater reformation, and, indeed, not even 
limited to Christianity either, though this has been my focal point in 
this essay.  Yet we might also label this the true ‘poverty’ of Christian 
thought, its weakness that is foolishness to the strength of this world, 
but is, in actuality, also the strength of its ‘crucified’ God.
82  Magid 2003, 254.
83  Ibid., 206.
84  On this, see Zarader 2006.
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